INTRODUCTION
Pressure for companies to behave responsibly towards the environment has grown dramatically in recent years. Sales of "green" products are mushrooming, reaching more than $40 billion in 2011 (Advertising Age, 2012) , and "sustainable and responsible investments" reached over $3 trillion in 2012 (United States SIF, 2013) . As social expectations for corporate responsibility have risen, many scholars and consultants have argued that it "pays to be green" (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; King and Lenox, 2001 ).
The notion that it "pays to be green" actually runs counter to a large literature finding that environmental regulations are costly for firms (for a thorough and influential review, see Palmer, Oates and Portney, 1995) . Indeed, the entire environmental regulatory paradigm is built around the idea that firms must be forced to make environmental improvements, because they will find it costly and unprofitable, and thus not do so on their own.
1 The EPA's regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act provides a valuable reminder that firms have fought climate regulation vigorously because they believe it will increase their costs. 2 Indeed, there is a large body of research finding that carbon regulation will impose costs on firms (Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2007; Aldy and Stavins, 2011) . Moreover, recent financial event studies confirm that under some circumstances it may "pay be to be brown."
Several recent papers find that firms may experience negative abnormal returns when it is disclosed that they took environmentally friendly actions or won green awards (Jacobs et al., 2010; Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011; . These papers do not advance and test specific mechanisms linking environmental performance and negative investor responses. However, they suggest that green firms incur unduly high costs, for which investors punish them. This inference is consistent with the large earlier literature that found it is costly for firms to be green. Apparently, Milton Friedman's (1970) 1 If environmental regulations were costless (or even carried a negative cost), it would be unnecessary to justify and measure the presumed social benefits of environmental programs and to make the case for incentive-based policy instruments that emphasize the incentives that these approaches provide for firms to innovate in abatement technology (Palmer et al., 1995) . 2 "Administration Presses Ahead With Limits on Emissions From Power Plants," The New York Times, 09/19/2013. dictum that the social responsibility of business is to maximize profits still has many adherents, who may sell shares of a firm seemingly engaged in what Friedman called "hypocritical window dressing."
If being green is not always a "win/win" proposition, and firms face a tension between the demands of shareholders and pressures from secondary stakeholders, then they may have incentives to exaggerate their environmental accomplishments through their information disclosure strategies, i.e., to greenwash (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Ramus and Montiel, 2005; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Kim and Lyon, 2011; Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Lyon and Montgomery, 2013; Marquis and Toffel, 2013; Bowen, 2014) . Indeed, market research suggests that a very high percentage of corporate green claims are misleading (Terrachoice, 2010) , and revered advertising agency Ogilvy and Mather says that greenwashing has reached "epidemic proportions" (Hsu, 2011) . The emerging literature on greenwash focuses on corporate decisions to (1) exaggerate favorable environmental performance, in order to improve the opinion of one or more stakeholders, rather than to (2) fully disclose both negative and positive aspects of environmental performance or to (3) simply remain silent (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Delmas and Burbano, 2011) .
In this paper, we extend the theory of greenwash to include a fourth option: firms may choose to "brownwash" by issuing communications that understate their environmental achievements. Ullmann (1985) suggests that in view of the costs associated with social responsibility programs, firms may systematically underreport their activities in this area (Ullmann, 1985) , but he does not conduct empirical tests, and the idea has not been explored in the subsequent literature. In light of the recent empirical research documenting that green credentials can harm share prices (Jacobs et al., 2010; Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011; , it is thus important to expand the discussion to incorporate this possibility. Indeed, a recent article in Forbes magazine discusses why companies continue to struggle to implement sustainable approaches to doing business and mentions the possibilities of both greenwash and brownwash: "Investors, consumers, academics, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), reporters, and employees all have their own perspectives on what companies should and should not be doing. A company can be returning a profit to shareholders, only to find protesters at its door or lawsuits filed…Companies struggle to inform employees, shareholders and stakeholders about how they are managing material social and environmental issues…Some companies overstate their impact.
Other companies, out of fear of being attacked, understate their accomplishments or wind up not communicating at all."
Although the term "brownwash" has an environmental flavor, it should be apparent that our analysis applies to social and governance disclosures more broadly (as the quote above suggests), as well as environmental ones. Firms, especially if they are under financial pressure, might understate their charitable contributions, their expenditures on employee benefits, or costly community development efforts. Similarly, firms might understate governance changes such as requiring the board to include union members or reflect racial or gender diversity.
Our analysis focuses on information disclosure decisions, but it is also relevant for the literature on the "decoupling" of organizations' formal structures and policies from actual implementation (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Westphal and Zajac, 1998) . Much of this literature studies situations where there is a lack of alignment between organizational policies and practices. For example, when there is a gap between the time of the commitment and the time implementation takes place (which might never happen), the organization is said to decouple its practice from its policy. This leads to a series of possibilities that parallel the first three disclosure options that we earlier identified in the greenwash literature. First, organizations may appear to be exaggerating their performance during the period before implementation, which parallels greenwashing. Second, over time firms may tightly couple their rhetoric and their actions (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Tilcsik, 2010; Hallett 2010; Sandholtz, 2012; Bromley and Powell, 2012) , which parallels full disclosure. 4 Third, it is also possible for an organization not to announce a commitment at all, but rather remain silent about a practice it has adopted (Bromley and Powell, 2012) . For example, the adoption of high-powered financial incentives for executives may be popular in the board room and among investors, but not among labor unions or the general public; firms may thus have incentives not to highlight such adoption publicly (Snellman, 2012) .
To the best of our knowledge, the fourth option, undue modesty, has not been explored in either the disclosure or the decoupling literatures. Thus, our analysis offers a new window on the relationship between rhetoric and reality in firm behavior. First, we show that firms have a broader range of options for communicating their social and environmental accomplishments than previously recognized---which, importantly, includes understating them. Second, we emphasize that stakeholders' preferences may change over time, and that they interact with changing firm characteristics (such as output growth and profitability), to determine a firm's mix of rhetoric and real action.
In order to better understand when firms greenwash and when they brownwash, we offer a theory that explicitly includes investor pressures, and that accounts for the dynamics of output growth and decline and their associated effects on the changing salience of different stakeholder groups over time (Mitchell et al., 1997) . We hypothesize that stakeholders in the regulatory arena are more salient when the firm is growing and expects to face more frequent and more demanding interactions with them. In contrast, shareholders are the more salient stakeholder group when economic deregulation occurs and when profits are low. 5 Thus, firms highlight their favorable environmental performance when they are growing in order to build a green reputation that will improve stakeholder interactions, and downplay their environmental commitments when investor pressure intensifies and profits are low. Empirically, we test these ideas using absolute growth and profits variables for each firm, and conduct robustness checks using various relative measures (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; King and Lenox, 2000; Bizjak, Lemmon, Naveen, 2008; Albuquerque, 2009 ).
Of course, greenwash is not without risk; if it is detected by external stakeholders, it may throw an organization's activities open to suspicion and reduce its ability to obtain resources, legitimacy, or social support (Oliver, 1991; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011) . On the other hand, brownwash makes the firm look less environmentally friendly than it really is, and may expose it to criticism from the media or from environmentalists. Thus, regardless of whether the firm is expanding or subject to greater shareholder pressure, we expect the firm to hew more closely to the truth when it experiences greater scrutiny from external stakeholders such as regulators or environmental activists.
Often, it is difficult or impossible to measure precisely the extent to which firms engage in greenwash. We overcome this challenge by focusing on US electric utilities, for which we can construct greenhouse gas emissions estimates. We then compare reductions in firms' emissions over time to the reductions they reported to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)'s Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program. Kim and Lyon (2011) showed that in the aggregate, participants in this program increased emissions over time but reported reductions, while non-participants actually reduced emissions.
This paper explores the behavior of program participants in detail. A striking empirical observation emerges: while many participants overstate their emissions reductions performance, many others understate it. Our theory explains why this occurs and identifies the conditions under which undue modesty is to be expected.
A DYNAMIC THEORY OF GREENWASH AND BROWNWASH
As pressure for corporate environmentalism has grown, greenwashing has grown along with it, and a body of literature on greenwashing has begun to emerge (Ramus and Montiel, 2005; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Kim and Lyon, 2011; Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Lyon and Montgomery, 2013; Marquis and Toffel, 2013; Bowen, 2014) . This work can be seen as part of the larger literature on misleading corporate behavior. In organizational theory, this includes a large body of work on decoupling and symbolic management (Meyer and Rowan, 1977 ; Pfeffer, 1981; Zajac, 1994, 2013) . In economics, there are large literatures on signaling (Spence, 1977) , partial disclosure (Milgrom, 1981) , and costly state falsification (Lacker and Weinberg, 1989) . In accounting and finance, there is a substantial body of work on selective disclosure (Verecchia 1983; Shin, 2003) .
The literature suggests greenwash is attractive when it can positively influence the opinions of consumers and investors regarding a firm or its products, but is deterred by scrutiny from external stakeholders such as environmental activists who can detect and punish greenwash (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Lyon and Montgomery, 2013) and by regulatory pressures (Delmas and Burbano 2011) . In addition, firm characteristics (such as size, profitability, incentive structure, and organizational inertia) and individual characteristics of managers (such as optimistic bias and narrow decision framing) may influence greenwashing behaviors (Delmas and Burbano 2011) .
However, the literature to date has ignored the possibility that greenwash may not necessarily influence the opinions of shareholders in a positive way. This is somewhat surprising given that Friedman (1970) long ago pointed out that managers might divert resources away from shareholder wealth maximization in order to indulge their own preferences for socially-responsible actions. Thus, especially during difficult economic times, managers might prefer to divert attention from costly social and environmental initiatives. We expand the theory of greenwash by including brownwash in the portfolio of strategies that organizations may adopt in response to stakeholder pressure. In order to clarify when each response is observed, we also expand the existing literature's static depiction of the drivers of greenwash and present a theory that emphasizes the dynamic path of firm production and profitability, and their impact on the salience of particular stakeholder groups.
First, we theorize that a firm's output growth is an important and under-appreciated factor that affects the incentives of stakeholders in the regulatory arena to monitor corporate behavior, and hence affects greenwashing. 6 Growth has been treated as a primary challenge for firms as they evolve (Penrose, 1959; Mishina, Pollock, and Porac, 2004; Chen, Williams, and Agarwal, 2012) . Among the impediments to growth identified in the literature is a changing technological regime (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006) . We posit that with increasing expectations and requests for corporate social responsibility, growing firms are especially subject to stakeholder pressures to use the most advanced socially responsible technologies in their productions and operations, and that they respond in 6 Other stakeholders such as customers may also be relevant. We address this subject in the discussion section.
part by decoupling. That is, growing firms experience a particularly strong tension between external pressures for social conformity and internal needs for operational efficiency, and this in turn increases their incentives to greenwash. Earlier work argued that firms gain more from greening themselves substantively when industry growth is higher, because investment in pollution prevention, organizational capabilities, reputation and political acumen all have higher payoffs in fast-growing industries (Russo and Fouts 1997) . We shift the focus from industry growth to the growth of the individual firm, and from substantive greening to greenwash.
We hypothesize that growing firms are more likely to engage in greenwash because of their exposure to pressures arising from the need to maintain their "license to operate" as they expand. These include, for example, pressures from local zoning regulations and environmental regulations, both of which provide opportunities for a variety of stakeholders to provide input into the social licensing process (Ingram et al. 2010) . Enhanced support from external stakeholders can reduce opportunistic hold-up by stakeholders with whom the firm has no explicit buyer or supplier contracts but whose cooperation is nevertheless required in order for the firm to create and capture value, and increase the probability that a business plan will proceed on schedule and on budget (Henisz, Dorobantu and Nartey, 2013) . Thus, from a high-level perspective, because growing firms must maintain their license to operate, and because a green image can help in this regard, they have incentives to greenwash. In particular, when firms expand, either through modifying existing facilities, or building new facilities, they must go through various regulatory approval processes (Environmental Law Institute, 2007) . These include New Source Review (NSR) under the Clean Air Act, under which new and modified air pollution sources are subject to preconstruction review and permitting (Decker, 2003) . Because NSR permits are issued on a project-byproject basis, when a firm wishes to expand or modify an existing plant, an NSR permit is required.
Depending on the frequency of modifications, a single plant can have several different NSR permits over the course of its operating life (Decker, 2003) . Evidence suggests that government regulators treat firms more favorably in the regulatory process when they have taken voluntary actions to improve their environmental performance, especially through participation in government-initiated programs. In particular, regulators ease the issuing of NSR permits for modification projects or new facilities (Decker, 2003) . Regulators also lessen the extent of scrutiny for firms that make voluntary environmental improvements, reducing the frequency of costly environmental inspections and enforcement actions (Innes and Sam, 2008) . Overall, growing firms thus have greater need of strategies to build positive environmental reputations and regulatory relationships and stronger incentives to greenwash, especially via corporate involvement in programs that are under the aegis of government.
Hypothesis 1: Growing firms are more likely to engage in greenwashing.
Given a firm's rate of growth, however, we also expect that closer scrutiny by external stakeholders lessens the extent of greenwash (Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Lyon and Montgomery, 2013; Bowen, 2014) . Empirical evidence supports this notion, as well. Firms were less likely to participate in the DOE's misleading Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry when they were headquartered in states with a higher density of Sierra Club members (Kim and Lyon, 2011) . Firms disclosed their environmental footprints more completely when they were headquartered in countries with a higher density of environmental NGO members (Marquis and Toffel, 2013) . Firms produced more substantive corporate social responsibility reports when they were more likely to be monitored by government authorities (Marquis and Qian, 2014) . In a similar fashion, we expect that firms will be less likely to engage in greenwash when external stakeholders such as regulators and environmental groups exert greater scrutiny over the firm's representations.
An important question is whether increased scrutiny should have a direct effect on greenwash, or should serve as a moderator of the effect of growth on greenwash. The papers cited in the previous paragraph find evidence of a direct effect of scrutiny on greenwash, but they do not allow for the possibility of brownwash. If external scrutiny pressures firms to connect rhetoric and reality more closely, then scrutiny should moderate both incentives to greenwash and incentives to brownwash. Thus, the direct effect of scrutiny on greenwash and the direct effect of scrutiny on brownwash will tend to cancel one another out, and it will be impossible to identify a direct effect of scrutiny. Instead, the specification needs to condition the effect of scrutiny upon whether the firm is growing, hence tending to greenwash rather than brownwash, and we therefore treat scrutiny as a moderator of the effect of growth.
Hypothesis 1A: The effect of growth on greenwash is attenuated by scrutiny from external stakeholders.
Next, we identify circumstances under which brownwash is more likely to occur. It has been suggested in the literature that firms may systematically underreport their social activities in order to disguise their associated costs (Ullmann, 1985) . Shareholders may suspect that the manager is pursuing social responsibility programs at the expense of other programs that can more directly further shareholders' interests (Friedman, 1970; Ullmann, 1985) . Previous studies suggest that social responsibility programs are likely to have negative implications for firm performance in the short run, even if they are beneficial in the long run (Khanna and Damon, 1999) . Furthermore, recent empirical findings demonstrate that shareholders may respond negatively to a firm's environmentally friendly practices, echoing the large earlier literature that making environmental improvements is costly. For example, Jacobs et al. (2010) found that corporate voluntary emissions reductions generated on average a statistically significant negative return of -.95%, and that non-governmental awards met with a statistically significant negative abnormal return of -.26%. Similarly, Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) found that the stock market responded negatively by -1% to corporate announcements of voluntary reductions in greenhouse emissions, as well as to announcements that a firm had joined the EPA's voluntary Climate Leaders program. Finally, found that the Chinese stock market as well as the Hong Kong stock market responded negatively by roughly -0.8% to announcements that a privately-owned firm had received a green company award. In light of these findings, we posit that as investor pressure intensifies, shareholders become the most salient stakeholder, thereby creating pressure to avoid disclosing information about social and environmental practices that could raise the firm's costs.
One circumstance under which shareholders become a markedly more salient stakeholder group is when a firm undergoes a change from governance via rate-of-return regulation on capital investment to governance via competition. How firms manage the transition from a regulated to a deregulated environment has been a topic of interest in strategy research (Mahon and Murray, 1980; Delmas, Russo, and Montes-Sancho, 2007; Kim, 2013) . In a regulated environment, firms are relatively shielded from pressure from shareholders because they are essentially governed by one or more industry-specific regulatory authorities. For example, electric utility companies are regulated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and by the state public utility commissions. Regulators can allow or forbid firms' actions that affect profitability, and also directly determine the allowed rate of return on capital investment. Under these circumstances, regulators are inevitably the most salient stakeholder group. Deregulation, however, changes the scenario and exposes firms to greater uncertainty and risks, in particular with respect to rate of return. These increased risks naturally draw the attention of investors, and force firms to weigh social and environmental spending more carefully and less favorably. Indeed, prior research has found that deregulation leads firms to reduce their substantive capital-intensive investments in environmental protection (Fowlie, 2010) . Thus, we expect shareholders to become the most salient stakeholder group under deregulation, and we hypothesize that this in turn pressures firms to withhold disclosure of costly social and environmental practices.
Hypothesis 2: Firms operating in a deregulated environment are more likely to brownwash.
In a deregulated environment, salience of shareholders increases even further when profits are low because firms with low profitability face increased market scrutiny (Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, and Holcomb, 2007) . In Mitchell et al. (1997) , shareholders are ordinarily classified as a "dominant stakeholder" because they possess power and legitimacy. But, when the firm's profits are low, the urgency of responding can make shareholders the "definitive stakeholder," as happened to several firms in 1993 when their performance plummeted, prompting the replacement of top managers at IBM, General
Motors and other firms (Mitchell et al., 1997) . We thus hypothesize that incentives for firms to brownwash are enhanced when the firm's profits are low in a deregulated environment because the salience of shareholders as a group increases.
Hypothesis 2A: Low profits in a deregulated environment make a firm more likely to brownwash.
While shareholders become more salient when profits are low, external stakeholders are likely to become less salient (Mitchell et al., 1997) . For example, when a firm's sales quantity declines, its environmental footprint automatically shrinks, just as a drop in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions created a modest silver lining to the Great Recession of 2008 /2009 (Broder, 2011 . Thus, the urgency of the claims of environmental advocates is diminished. Nevertheless, these stakeholders remain relevant, and hence the definitiveness of shareholders during a period of low profits will be mitigated by the intensity of scrutiny from external stakeholders. Because brownwash makes the firm look less environmentally friendly than it really is, it runs the risk of exposing the firm to criticism from the media or from environmentalists (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Bansal and Clelland, 2004; King, 2008) . Thus, even when profits are low, we expect the firm to hew more closely to the truth when it experiences greater scrutiny from external stakeholders such as regulators or environmental activists.
Hypothesis 2B: The effect of investor pressure on brownwash is attenuated by scrutiny from external stakeholders.
THE VOLUNTARY GREENHOUSE GAS REGISTRY
The According to the Department of Energy (DOE)'s Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry website, the benefits of participation for firms are primarily in the form of publicity and improved relationships with regulators. A more strategic motivation, consultants advised, was that a "proactive stance that includes voluntary greenhouse gas emissions reduction efforts may delay regulatory action" (Trexler and McFall 1993) . Should regulatory action be unavoidable, participation would also be advantageous because it could "establish a basis for requesting consideration of prior actions in a possible future 'credit for early reductions' program" (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2005).
An important aspect of the Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program is that it was designed with few hard and fast rules about how to report reductions. Voluntary reporters could choose to report reductions at the "entity level" (entire firm) or at the "project level" (individual reduction project), and could define the boundary of the entity or project. Voluntary reporters also had leeway in choosing either a historical baseline emissions level or calculating a hypothetical one. Reporters could either report reductions in absolute emissions or reductions in emissions intensity, and could report indirect reductions or sequestration as well as direct reductions. 8 All this flexibility gave firms substantial ability to shape the presentation of their emissions profile.
The projects reported range from reducing emissions at the electric power generation, transmission and distribution stages to demand-side management and carbon sequestration. Abatement strategies at the generation stage include switching from high-to low-carbon fuel sources, improving plant availability at low-carbon generators such as nuclear and hydro, plant efficiency improvement, increases in low-or zero-emitting generation capacity, decreases in high-emitting capacity, and retirement 7 For details about the program, see Kim and Lyon (2011) . 8 Direct reductions refer to greenhouse gas reductions from sources owned by the reporter such as power plant emissions reductions at the electricity generation stage. Indirect reductions refer to greenhouse gas reductions from sources not owned by the reporter but somehow affected by reporter actions such as from end-users via demand side management programs. In these cases of discrepancies, NRDC used the FERC-based estimates. In cases where fuel consumption data were not available, this paper supplemented the fuel consumption-based estimates with adjusted CEMS estimates to increase the number of observations. 13 Below we describe our variables in detail. Table 1 summarizes them.
[ Table 1 about here]
Dependent Variable
Deviation between reported and actual emissions reductions. We focus on the accuracy with which a firm's reported emissions reductions correspond to the actual change in its greenhouse gas emissions. To do so, we compute the difference between reported and actual emissions reductions, normalized by the firm's level of reported reductions. That is, we compute RA X R   where R is the reported level of reductions and A is the actual level of reductions. Compared to a simple measure of the gap between reported and actual emissions, which might be skewed by the presence of a few large firms, our measure is normalized by the size of the firm's reported emissions reductions. While we could have normalized by dividing through by actual emissions reductions, we chose to normalize by reported reductions because A can be negative if net emissions increased over time.
Using the continuous variable that measures the deviation between reported and actual emissions reductions as our dependent variable, we test the hypotheses related to the drivers of greenwash and brownwash. We use a specification with firm-level fixed effects because firm-level dummies are jointly significant (F(53, 321)=7.85, P-value=0.0) and the Sargan-Hansen statistic-the modified version of the Hausman test for clustered data-rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the fixed-effects specification (Sargan-Hansen statistic 867.923 Chi-sq(20) P-value = 0.0).
14 The residuals of our fixed-effects regressions show significant cross-sectional dependence (Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence = 14.899, P-value= 0.0), and thus we estimate fixed-effect regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors that are robust to cross-sectional dependence as well as robust to common panel problems, i.e., autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Hoechle, 2007; Driscoll and Kraay, 1998) .
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Independent Variables
Firm Growth We focus on growth in output, which basically captures growth in the amount of electricity generated. This measure has the advantage relative to sales revenue that it is not confounded by changes in price in measuring growth over time. Growth in output is calculated as percentage changes in annual output, that is, percentage changes in annual net generation for each electric utility (Gollop and Roberts, 1983 ).
Profits We hypothesize that under-reporting of social activities is more likely to occur when firm profits are low in a deregulated environment. We measure firm profits with net income. Net income represents managers' primary fiscal responsibility and reflects bottom-line performance (Voss, Cable and Voss, 2006) . In regulated markets, the central focus is on a firm's rate of return on assets, which can lead firms to overcapitalize (Averch and Johnson, 1962) . However, in deregulated markets investors are free to pursue profit maximization directly (Fabrizio et al. 2007) , which is better captured by net income. Since our Hypothesis 2A focuses on deregulated markets, we use net income as an explanatory variable.
Deregulation The U.S. Energy Information Administration provides the status of retail deregulation in each state, which has been used in prior studies (Delmas, Russo, Montes-Sancho, 2007; Kim, 2013) . 16 To take into account the possibility that firm behavior may be affected earlier than the actual implementation of retail deregulation legislation (Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram, 2007) , we create a dummy variable that indicates either the enactment of legislation or the issuance of a regulatory order, whichever is earlier.
Following Delmas et al. (2007) and Kim (2013) , for each company we weight the dummy variable by the share of the firm's electricity sales in each state. For example, if a company sells 50% of its electricity sales in a deregulated state and the remaining 50% in a regulated state, the weighted deregulation variable for this company takes the value of 0.5.
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Interactions with External Scrutiny We measure external scrutiny using three variables. The first is the average of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores for political representatives in a firm's state.
The LCV scores are based on the voting records of the Representatives and Senators in the U.S. Congress in favor of an environmental agenda, ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest score. Thus, the LCV scores measure the preferences of a state's elected representatives (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010) , and to the extent legislators represent their constituents' preferences (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006) , LCV scores also embody the citizens' general sentiment towards environmental issues (Delmas, Russo, and Montes-Sancho, 2007; Doshi, Dowell, and Toffel, 2013 This variable measures the extent to which a state inspects polluting facilities and takes enforcement actions against violators, thus indicating the intensity of regulatory scrutiny to which facilities are actually subjected in each state (Gray and Shimshack, 2011) .
Control Variables
We include a set of control variables to reflect important dimensions of firm heterogeneity and external environmental factors that may affect the deviation between reported and actual emissions reductions.
Firm size/Visibility. Visible firms are more likely to be subject to external pressures (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010; Meznar and Nigh, 1995) . We thus explicitly control for firm size/visibility as measured by revenues (Patten, 2002; Albuquerque, 2009 ). In addition to being subject to greater pressures, large firms may enjoy economies of scale in compliance, or have better access to capital markets and hence lower costs of new investments (Khanna and Damon, 1999; Innes and Sam, 2008) . we use is calculated by dividing the % goal stipulated in a state's RPS by the difference between the goal year and the enacted or effective year, whichever comes first (Kim, 2013) . State RPS data are obtained from www.dsireusa.org.
Intra-Firm Communication
Other Firm Characteristics
We include two variables designed to capture other potential sources of heterogeneity across firms related to carbon emissions. Capacity factor refers to the ratio of energy generated to the maximum that could have been generated; it is calculated by dividing net generation (MWh) by nameplate capacity (MW) times 8,760 (the number of hours in a year). Changes in CO 2 20 http://www.census.gov/govs/apes 21 We thank Jay Shimshack for generously sharing this data with us. 22 We also tested whether the control variables for state resource allocation played a significant role in moderating the effect of growth on greenwashing, but the interaction terms were insignificant. The same was true for interaction effects with net income.
emissions refer to changes in CO 2 equivalent emissions, that is, it includes carbon-based pollutants other than CO 2 . This variable captures changes in the overall portfolio of electricity generation from the perspective of greenhouse gas emissions. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis along with the correlations between each of the variables.
RESULTS
[ Interaction terms involving the external scrutiny variables are highly correlated across each other. We thus include interaction terms separately in regressions. [ Figure 1 about here]
We turn now to an empirical analysis of the drivers of greenwashing and brownwashing. Table 3 shows regression results using firm-level fixed-effects with standard errors robust to autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional dependence.
[ (the sample mean), the effect of a one percent increase in the growth rate would be reduced to 22.6%.
We find support for Hypothesis 2 that deregulation is likely to lead to brownwash. In a regulated environment, firms are relatively shielded from pressure from shareholders because they are essentially governed by regulatory authorities. With deregulation, this shield is lifted and regulators are no longer the most salient stakeholder group. Instead, the salience of shareholders increases, driving brownwash. Also consistent with this argument, the coefficients for the interaction variable between net income and deregulation are positive and significant in most specifications, and outweigh the size of the coefficients for the negative net income variable. Since the deregulation dummy takes the value of one in a deregulated environment, these findings provide support for our Hypothesis 2A that lower profits increase the likelihood of under-reporting in a deregulated environment. More specifically, based on model (6), in a deregulated environment, a one billion dollar decrease in net income leads to 15.7% more underreporting. Regarding Hypothesis 2B, we ran regressions with interactions between net income and our external scrutiny variables and found that they are significant in the direction we hypothesized, although the significance is not as strong as in the case of the growth variable. That is, the effect of investor pressure on brownwash is weakly attenuated by scrutiny from external stakeholders. For example, based on model (12), in a deregulated state with no Sierra Club members, a one billion dollar decrease in net income leads to 188.1% more brownwashing. However, if the state had 1.722 Sierra Club members per thousand citizens (the sample mean), the effect of a one billion dollar decrease in net income would be reduced to 133.4% more brownwashing.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, we performed a set of robustness checks for our main effects using various relative performance variables. Based on our theory development, the importance of growth comes from increased interactions with stakeholders in the regulatory arena. Thus, absolute growth matters, whereas relative growth compared to peer firms does not necessarily matter. On the contrary, under the circumstances where investor pressure intensifies, both absolute and relative profits matter because the importance of profits comes from increased salience of shareholders who can shift their investments to more profitable firms. Thus, to provide further support for our theory, we created various relative growth and profits variables based on the prior literature, 23 and ran regressions replacing the absolute growth and profits variables in Table 3 . For simplicity, only the regression coefficients for the relative growth and profits variables and their interactions with deregulation are shown in Table 4 .
The results for the other variables are similar to those shown in Table 3 . As expected, the relative growth variables in Panel A of Table 4 are mostly not significant, and the relative profit variables in Panel B of Table 4 show similar results as the absolute profit variable. This supplementary evidence provides additional confidence that our empirical results are capturing the hypothesized effects in a robust manner.
It is worth noting that our sample is restricted to firms that chose to participate in the Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program. Kim and Lyon (2011) study the decisions of electric utilities to either join the program or not. That paper found that participants tended to be large firms facing strong regulatory pressure, and that pressure from environmental groups reduced the likelihood of participation.
Non-participants were more likely to be shrinking, so according to our Hypothesis 1, they should have been more likely to brownwash. We obviously cannot test this since they did not join the program, but their decision to not participate is broadly consistent with the hypothesis, since they were effectively 23 Relative growth and relative profits are estimated in several ways: relative to industry (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) , relative to small/large firms (Bizjak, Lemmon, Naveen, 2008) , relative to size quartiles (Albuquerque, 2009 ), relative to revenue based on the residuals obtained by OLS regressions (King and Lenox, 2000) . Relative profits are also estimated relative to firm output based on the residuals obtained by OLS regressions. Since the growth variable builds on firm output, this approach was not used for estimating relative growth.
understating their environmental improvements by remaining silent. Thus, our empirical findings in this paper may understate the frequency of brownwashing in the general population of firms.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The decoupling literature has argued that decoupling is especially likely when institutional environments are multifaceted and conflicting institutional demands for conformity exist (Oliver, 1991; Seo and Creed, 2002; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Pache and Santos, 2010; Smith and Lewis, 2011) . The direction of decoupling identified in the literature, however, is limited to exaggeration ("greenwash") of organizational actions, with the exception of Ullmann (1985) . We have proposed the possibility of undue modesty ("brownwash") about organizational actions as another decoupling possibility, especially as they relate to environmental, social and governance issues. We have further proposed that which form of decoupling is more prevalent depends on the balance of power among competing stakeholder groups (Mitchell et al., 1997) , emphasizing that stakeholders' preferences may change over time, and that they interact with changing firm characteristics, to determine the direction of decoupling.
In the context of environmental disclosure, we have shown that firm growth leads to greenwash due to an anticipation of increased interactions with stakeholders in the regulatory arena. We have also shown that deregulation leads to brownwash due to increased salience of shareholders, and that this effect is exacerbated by lower profits. That is, in a deregulated environment, lower profits lead to more brownwash. As one would expect, this relationship holds for both absolute and relative profits compared to peer firms. We further show that the extent of both greenwash and brownwash is attenuated by external scrutiny in the form of NGO and regulatory pressures.
While our results suggest that certain stakeholders are important drivers of greenwash and brownwash, other stakeholders we have not examined might be relevant as well. For example, in marketing, it has been noted that companies have to tread a fine line in marketing their social activities to customers (O'Sullivan, 1997).
"If they don't say enough about their charity links consumers believe the companies are hiding something and if they say too much they believe charities are being exploited by the big corporations. It makes the promotion of such schemes one of the most delicate jobs in marketing."
Whether customer pressure drives greenwash or brownwash is likely to depend upon the nature of the product and its production process, as well as customer beliefs about them. Large marketing and environmental economics literatures find that social performance influences consumers' product perceptions, consumers' product responses, and consumers' willingness to pay (e.g. Loureiro and Lotade 2005; Roe et al. 2011; Eichholtz et al 2011) . The rapidly growing number of "green claims" made on product packaging suggests that companies believe some final consumers prefer green products. 24 At the same time, customers may have concerns that greater emphasis on social and environmental impacts may degrade product performance. A 2007 study of 7,751 consumers around the world identifies negative perceptions toward environmentally friendly products as one of the barriers to buying green product (Bonini and Oppenheim, 2008) . For example, early hybrid cars had less power than non-hybrid cars.
Compact fluorescent light bulbs also had to overcome problems: early versions were slow to light up, had weak light when they did illuminate, and didn't fit properly into most normal light fixtures (Bonini and Oppenheim, 2008) . Identifying circumstances under which stakeholders such as customers drive greenwash or brownwash is an interesting topic for future research.
25
One reason the Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program we studied can be said to facilitate greenwash or brownwash is that its requirements were intentionally loose, to encourage wide firm participation. For example, the Program gave firms the choice of whether to report on the basis of specific emissions reductions projects, or on the basis of the overall entity footprint (Kim and Lyon, 2011) . We conducted two-stage regressions to explore the impact of these alternative reporting modes on 24 See Terrachoice Group Inc.'s http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/ for more information on changes in the extent of 'green' labeling over time. 25 We conducted a series of regressions that included fraction of sales to residential customers as an independent variable, since prior studies suggest that residential customers are more likely to be sensitive to environmental claims (see for example, Delmas, Russo, and Montes-Sancho, 2007) . Unfortunately, this variable proved to be a constraint on sample size, reducing it by 45 firm-year observations. This changes the sample means for our key variables significantly (e.g., for the net income variable, chi-sq(1)=33.28, P-value=0.0) and causes the precision with which we are able to estimate our main independent variables to drop. Furthermore, the fraction of sales to residential customers variable is never statistically significant. Thus, we do not report these regressions in the paper.
greenwash and brownwash, but they were statistically insignificant and did not affect other coefficients in the regression results. In fixed-effect models, of course, the alternative reporting modes drop out because they are time-invariant. One interesting result that emerged in the process, however, was a tendency of firms located within the same region of the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) to adopt similar reporting modes. Normative pressures to adopt business practices deemed to be legitimate may be transmitted through such professional organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) , and under this circumstance, strategic choice may be important at the collective level, not at the level of single firm (Astley and Fombrun, 1983) . While our results provide some evidence of the existence of such a process, it did not play a significant role in determining the difference between reported and actual emissions reductions, so we do not report these results here.
Our empirical analysis was conducted for an environmental issue in an industry in which regulatory institutions place serious constraints on corporate behavior, and one may wonder whether our results are likely to generalize to other settings. We note that although economic regulation of utilities is a relatively special case, most heavily polluting industries-such as chemicals, steel, pulp and paper, and oil refining-are subject to significant environmental regulation, which in itself can create a threat of external scrutiny. Furthermore, growth in any industry with environmental impacts typically requires permits issued through government institutions. Thus, we expect that the growth effect that we have identified, and the mitigating impact of external scrutiny, will generalize to environmental issues in other industry settings. Furthermore, social issues such as sweatshop labor and equal employment opportunity are amenable to pressure from secondary stakeholders (Harrison and Scorse, 2010) , and are likely to generate dynamics similar to those for environmental issues. Corporate relationships with shareholders are also likely to be similar in less heavily regulated industries, with their salience increasing with decreasing profits. Thus, although our empirical setting is special in some respects, we expect the main relationships we identify to hold in other settings; nevertheless, further research confirming the generality of our findings would be worthwhile. 
Control variables
Sierra Club density Sierra Club membership per thousand population at the state level
Capacity factor
The ratio of energy generated to the maximum that could have been generated. (1) Deviation between reported and actual emissions reductions (2) Sierra Club density (3) LCV score: average (4) RPS index (5) Enforcement (6) State environmental spending (%) (7) State environmental employee (%) (8) Capacity factor (9) Operating revenue (10) Number of subsidiaries (11) Table 3 with relative growth measures (refer to p.24 for more details). 2 The industry mean is calculated separately for small and large firms based on firm revenue. 3 The industry median is calculated separately for small and large firms based on firm revenue. 4 The mean is calculated separately for four quartiles based on firm revenue. 5 The median is calculated separately for four quartiles based on firm revenue. 6 The residual obtained by OLS regression of growth on firm revenue. 7 The residual obtained by OLS regression of growth on firm revenue and the square of firm revenue. 1 This table shows results replacing the income variable and the interaction variable between income and deregulation in model (6) of Table 3 with relative income measures (refer to p.24 for more details). 2 The industry mean is calculated separately for small and large firms based on firm revenue. 3 The industry median is calculated separately for small and large firms based on firm revenue. 4 The mean is calculated separately for four quartiles based on firm revenue. 5 The median is calculated separately for four quartiles based on firm revenue. 6 The residual obtained by OLS regression of income on firm output. 7 The residual obtained by OLS regression of income on firm output and the square of firm output. 8 The residual obtained by OLS regression of income on firm revenue. 9 The residual obtained by OLS regression of income on firm revenue and the square of firm revenue. 
